This article looks at the history of left-wings in Colombia, framed within what was happening in the country, Latin America, and the world between 1958 and 2010. After specifying what we mean by "left-wings" and outlining their background in the first half of the 20th century, there is a panorama of five great moments of the period under study to reach the recent situation. The chronology favors the internal aspects of the history of Colombian left-wings, allowing us to appreciate their achievements and limitations framed into such a particular context as the Colombian one. 
 Is revolution just around the corner? (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981)  A meeting with the country (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) )  Crisis of left-wings (1991-1999)  Towards reconstruction (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) Background As the central theme of this article consists in the Colombian left-wings in the second half of the 20 th century and the early 21 st century, we will not address in detail its long gone background. 3 Although there were calls for a vague socialism by liberal radical intellectuals in the current Colombian territory since the mid-19 th century, it was observed only until the third decade of the 20 th century due, among other factors, to the relative economic backwardness of the country, the conservative political closure since 1886, and the existence of an anti-socialist ideology even before this thought could acquire a political shape (MOLINA, 1987) . Mauricio Archila, Jorge Cote Revista Tempo e Argumento, Florianópolis, v. 7, n. 16, p. 376 -400, set./dez. 2015.
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Tempo & Argumento Indeed, in early 1919, a socialist conference was held in Bogotá, which although adopting a reformist program, had a face different from the traditional bipartisanship. 4 That early socialism gave way to Creole communist and anarchist versions, which would be expressed in workers' congresses in the mid-1920s, where the Confederación Obrera Nacional (CON) was conceived, in 1925, and then the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR), in 1926. This Party rushed to capture the early wage-earner cores, and through novel politicization means, such as tours of the socialist leader María Cano, it managed to make the elites shiver. She, and other leaders of the PSR, directed the great strikes in the oil -October 1927-and banana enclaves -November-December 1928-, which led to bloodshed of proletariat, especially the latter, in the famous "masacre" de Ciénaga.
These strikes were a part of the insurrectionary tactic adopted by the Colombian socialists, in accordance with some old liberal military people, to jeopardize the conservative hegemony. However, the country did not opt for the insurgency fueled by right-wing intransigence, but for a civilian way out driven by liberal notables that promoted the institutionalization of labor dispute.
In this government change the left-wing also changed. In August 1930, the PSR was turned into a Bolshevik-style party, according to the guidelines set by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Partido Comunista de Colombia (PCC) was born, which in its early years took a confrontational tactic, but it changed in the mid-1930s, at the initiative of the Communist International, in a political alliance with the progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie -the Frentes Populares-to halt the advance of fascism. At this time, other expressions of an intellectual left-wing without major political influence also emerged. Parallel for a few years, the liberal left-wing leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, fueled a political group -Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria (UNIR)-very close to the imperialist ideology of the Peruvian Haya de la Torre, a group that fought very firmly against the PCC, but then it came back to the liberal rows.
In Colombia, as in other Latin American countries, at the end of the Second World War a popular radicalization took place, and the response to it was a shift towards the right-wing triggered by the USA within the framework of the Cold War. In the country, Popular to be abandoned in the communist bloc led by the USSR. As a consequence, the PCC, in its V Congreso, held in July 1947, resumed the Marxist-Leninist principles and abandoned the "Browder's" theses adopted in the early 1940s.
5
In this context and faced with the increased bipartisan violence and persecution of the PCC members, the Colombian communism also opened the discussion on the relevance of the guerrilla movement as a means of resistance (MEDINA, 1980: p. 598 ). In the late 1940s, the Partido claimed the need to train peasant self-defense forces against the wave of official violence. In this regard, its work in the armed movement in those years was promoting some kind of coordination and unity of action between guerrillas of liberal or communist influence.
With the rise of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to power, in 1953, official persecution of the PCC was ratified, even making it illegal. This situation continued until 1957, when, after the military dictatorship fell, the Partido supported the plebiscite in December of that year for creating the bipartisan coalition named as Frente Nacional. 6 The following year, the PCC ordered its members to vote for the liberal presidential candidate, Alberto Lleras
Camargo. This decision caused unrest in a part of its members, so that internal tensions already expressed about the role of armed struggle during Violencia became clearer.
Just as in much of the world, the dominance of the PCC in the scenario of the Colombian left-wing was a feature of this period. As pointed out by Medófilo Medina, the 5 Browderism is named after Earl Browder, an U.S. communist leader, who in the heat of the alliance between the USSR and the USA during the Second World War spoke of the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism, the creation of mass communist parties rather than boards, and getting closer to the national bourgeoisie. The PCC adopted these ideas in its II Congreso held in 1944, when it temporarily changed its name to Partido Socialista Democrático (MEDINA, 1980, 529-544) . 6 This was a coalition regime between the two traditional parties on a parity basis to cut off all of the State branches and alternate the presidency during four periods (HARTLYN, 1993) .
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Partido managed in those years to gather dissident groups, also one which in 1947 was largely driven by much of the labor militancy (MEDINA, 1980, 599 Emergence of "new left-wings" (1959-1969) 7 Indeed, Castro's movement triumph generated great expectations in the global left-wing, especially in the Latin American one, since it was an indigenous revolution, alien to the Soviet Union's influence, committed as it was with "peaceful coexistence." From then on, and for a long time, Cuba became the revolutionary model for the new Latin
American left-wing, especially due to the renewed struggle forms that focalism meant. intervention, fueling countless protests around the world. Such events were condensed 7 The term "new left-wing" as such emerged in England after the invasion of Hungary in 1956. Incensed by this outrage, some dissidents deviated from the British Communist Party and also increased distance from the labor movement (KAYE, 1989) . Meanwhile, in France a dissident group emerges within the leftwing in the context of the liberation war in Algeria, between 1956 and 1962 (TEODORI, 1977 . The European "new left-wing" was opposed to bureaucratization and reformism of the "old" communist and socialist parties. Eventually, it was influenced by old anarchist and Trotskyist currents, as well as by the new Maoism and certain national liberation movements in Asia and Africa, especially Castrism or Guevarism. 8 Focalism is not far from the Leninist model, because it consists in leaderships that accelerate the revolutionary process. Of course, in a case it is the party and acts in a rather urban context, while in another the political-military apparatus is deployed in the rural world (DEBRAY, 1975) . It is needless to point out that some communist parties resorted to armed struggle, such as in Venezuela, Guatemala, and, later, El Salvador (MARTÍ and FIGUEROA, 2006) . Then, Colombia maintained the guideline of peasant self-defense, which in the mid-1960s became the "combination of all struggle forms," a political choice that will hold against all odds until recent times. Colombia was not immune to those continental and global changes. Even after the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla, and unlike a large part of the Latin American countries, it did not undergo any de facto military regime, the establishment of the Frente Nacional (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) ) fueled a high degree of political and social exclusion of forces not committed to bipartisanship (HARTLLYN, 1993, 105) . Within this frame of limited democracy and faced with the hesitations of the PCC the early organizations of the new Colombian left-wing were conceived.
10
Such was the case of the Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino (MOEC), which emerged from the situation of protest against transport price increase in early 1959. The following year, its first congress was held in Cali, the city showing the greatest social unrest at the time. In a hasty attempt to transplant the Cuban revolution, it organized guerrilla groups in peripheral areas, but with recent economic growth, where a 9 Such university effervescence was also felt in Latin America. The most notable was the student movement in Mexico whose symbolic date was the Tlatelolco slaughter, in October 1968 (VOLPI, 2001) . 10 We resume herein what is written in Archila (2003, 278-286) .
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Tempo & Argumento part of its leadership died. Then, it was divided into two wings: a "leftist," which sought the immediate revolutionary explosion, and a "Marxist," which intended to organize the people before the insurrection. Such a division became clear when they expelled each other. Then, they were fractionated into multiple cores, which would generate, years later, the Movimiento Obrero Independiente y Revolucionario (MOIR), one of the two main Maoist parties in the country.
Indeed, the MOIR was founded in Medellin, in 1969, although at first it was not defined if it was a political organization or a trade union apparatus. For instance, in January 1970 it launched the slogan of national patriotic strike, but it was postponed for no apparent reason. We never knew if it was a workers' strike, a general strike, or an abstentionist movement. This ambiguity has been a feature of its political behavior. Thus, in 1972, it ran in elections for the first time, although it did not renounce the revolutionary discourse, yet, which is going to be abandoned until it joins the most critical left-wing sector in the armed struggle. Then, it would ally with the PCC in an electoral front, to quickly leave this and go on with its radical rhetoric, but having close ties to elite sectors towards building a national bourgeoisie.
11
Meanwhile, various communist dissident groups generated guerrilla movements marked by focalism, but also showing early Maoist influences, then Trotskyist ones. In 1962, there was a conference of various leftist groups to form the Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria (FUAR). Gaitanist sectors converged there -among them the caudillo's daughter-, socialists, former communists, and people from the independent trade unions movement and the student movement. They were united by common contempt for the so-called "electoral farce" and sympathy for the armed struggle, without putting it into practice. Although leftist, the FUAR did not claimed to be Marxist. It was subsequently fragmented around the definition of routes to revolution.
The other significant pole of this time was condensed into the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (MEDINA, 1996) . With a self-critical look at the early guerrilla adventures, a group of young liberal radicals who had traveled to Cuba, then it (MEDINA, 1996, 141) . By the mid-1970s, while its main leader was absent from the country, the organization began a process of thinking through the concept of focalism.
13
During the same years when the ELN was conceived, and almost on the same foundations, the Partido Comunista Marxista Leninista (PC-ML) emerged, the other Maoist stronghold until the late 1970s (VILLARRAGA and PLAZAS, 1995) . After the SinoSoviet split, there was a minority sector within the PCC and a larger figure in the Juventud
Comunista that, when expelled, called all Marxist-Leninists to form a new party. In July 1965, they held the "décimo" Congreso, resorting to this ordinal to keep numbering the events organized by the PCC, which they sought to reconstitute. The new party's armed 12 Many of these young individuals were members of the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL), which at first was against the Frente Nacional, but then it rejoined liberalism. Others came from communism and some from the radicalized student movement. It is worth noticing that the ELN was the only group founded abroad and it oddly had a Spanish man as the main leader for several years, the priest Manuel Pérez (BRODERICK, 2001) . It is also important to realize that this guerrilla recruited the largest number of Christians, some of them churchmen. 13 The ELN is perhaps the most radical guerrilla and it never signed a truce with the Colombian State, indeed, still today -April 2015-it did not finish negotiations on a peace agreement. But the strongest mark of Maoism was rivalry, sometimes armed, with the PCC and its armed wing.
To complete the frame of those years, we must mention the very emergence of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). After the hesitant statements by the PCC regarding armed struggle, there came the State's offensive against the socalled "repúblicas independientes." The operation against some zones of "colonización armada," such as Marquetalia, pressed the call for the first communist guerrilla conference, in late 1964. In May 1966, the self-defense forces definitely turned into the FARC. They followed a model of military self-defense and support to the activity of the Partido until the 1980s, then varied to a more aggressive tactic to seek power. The history of the FARC was less spectacular than that of other guerrilla groups in those years and the organization was even about to succumb, because of some military failures. Unlike the other Colombian guerrillas, it was always based on peasants, something which was reflected on its early political platform (PIZARRO, 1995) . In this regard, it was far from the focalism prevailing in the other armed groups and, in practice, it came closer to the "prolonged popular war" characterizing the Chinese experience.
14 Some of them would become years later the political-military organization Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), which took a seat on the north coast and it was demobilized in 1991, after trying to merge with the ELN. In fact, there was another Maoist fraction that joined this guerrilla for some years, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), but many of its members were demobilized in the mid-1990s, as we will see below.
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Is revolution just around the corner? (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) The international arena in this period was marked by the end of economic growth in the core countries, which is, in turn, a result from the increase in oil prices in 1973.
Under these conditions, the European Welfare States went into crisis and "the strong truths from the Fordist era began to crumble" (ELEY, 2003, 402) In Colombia, the period concerned is framed by the crisis of the Frente Nacional and its slow dismantling since 1974. The 1970 elections, accused of "fraudulent" by the opposition, served to stir the debate on the revolutionary pathway at the heart of the left-wing. While general Rojas, then seeking his populist phase, showed the potential of mass mobilization, the "fraud" with which he took the virtual triumph showed the limitations of the electoral process (AYALA, 2006 15 Trotskyism, with great intellectual leadership, came to influence the university and trade union world and also the peasant movement in the early 1970s (GARCÍA, 2009). However, just like Maoism, it was characterized by great internal pugnacity and successive divisions, generating a stream of acronyms in the tutelary shadow of Leon Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg. 16 Firmes was dissolved in an alliance with the PCC in the early 1980s. Just like the Alternative magazine, it was influenced by the M-19. 17 Although Turbay had already proclaimed the Estatuto de Seguridad few days before the first anniversary of the Paro Cívico in 1977, the gruesome assassination of former minister of government, Rafael Pardo Buelvas, by an urban commando named Autodefensa Obrera (ADO), was used by the president to justify repression. This small group was decimated after this horrible crime and the remainder was demobilized in 1985.
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Tempo & Argumento A meeting with the country (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) In 1981, Ronald Reagan became the U.S. President, and he, in addition to reaffirming the neoliberal model implemented by Thatcher in England, leads the Cold War to its utmost expression by promoting an arms race with the Soviet Union. The latter was forced to spend huge sums on defense and neglect the population's welfare. The "real socialism" was running into its own limitations, so urgent reforms were needed to survive (HOBSBAWM, 1994) . In this context, Mikhail Gorbachev took office in the USSR in 1985
and focuses his reform program on "perestroika" -economic and political restructuringand "glasnost" -information transparency. Thus, the discontent that had been maturing for years behind the "iron curtain" comes out and, fortunately, it did not face the old Soviet repressive response. As a new domino -now under another sign-, one after another, the satellite countries move away from the Soviet control and depose their communist governments. In late 1989, the symbolic fall of the Berlin wall, which halved
Germany and Europe as a whole. Two years after the Soviet Union itself would disappear, torn apart by nationalist appetites in a number of countries that could not even federate (ELEY, 2003: cap. 25) . Meanwhile, in faraway China, under the leadership of Deng Xiao
Ping, the pragmatic turn to the capitalist economy was consolidated, without producing any liberalization at the political level (HOBSBAWM, 1994, 486-487) .
The Latin American left-wings did not stop at just watching the collapse of "real socialism." They got increasingly involved in the fight against dictatorships and sought to resume democracy. Although they did not translate into immediate electoral success, they got increasingly committed to extend citizenship to the inhabitants of the region.
The democratic winds also hit the guerrilla left-wing, which in many parts resumed criticism of weapons. After the 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the privileged scene of struggle was Central America, especially El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala.
The electoral defeat of Sandinismo and the setbacks of insurgent forces in other countries led them to negotiation processes to disarm (MARTI and FIGUEROA, 2006; WICKMAN-CROWLEY, 1992) .
In Colombia, the left-wing also took the democratic challenge of promoting peace talks with the administration of Belisario Betancur (1982 Betancur ( -1986 , which were implemented 
p.390
Tempo & Argumento fell assassinated in the streets of Bogota. In its turn, the FARC kept the peace agreements for two more years. The political grouping triggered by the guerrilla to enter the public sphere, the Unión Patriótica (UP), was quickly decimated, something which has been labeled as a "political genocide." 18 Something similar happens with political fronts of other guerrillas, such as A Luchar, promoted by the ELN and trade union sectors, and the 18 There are no exact figures of dead members of the UP, except the generalized expression that they are more than 3,500 (ARCHILA, 2003, 122) . In a thesis to obtain the title of Historian, the student Johana Trujillo (2005) managed to document 1,095 cases between 1986 and 1990. Most of the victims correspond to areas where there was a historical presence of the FARC and increased figures of dead members of the UP were observed within electoral periods.
p.391
Tempo & Argumento Crisis of left-wings (1991-1999) The fall of "real socialism" was ratified with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War. Capitalism in its late phase, clearly neoliberal, is imposed by almost all the world, with a particular orthodoxy in the former socialist countries, so that some of its advocates rush to celebrate the "end of History." However, the triumph of economic liberalism did not mean the strengthening of its political counterpart, liberal democracy. The USA clearly emerged as the great power to be faced, no longer a similar opponent, but multiple resistance foci with various identities ranging from fight against neo-liberalism to opposition to the West and its Judeo-Christian tradition (HOBSBAWM, 1994) .
Given these events, the world communist and socialist left-wing failed to act with the same speed and strength of the past. Abandoning the revolutionary tradition and internationalism seemed to be the response to the fall of real socialism. In such a collapse of the global partisan left-wing, social movements re-emerge, now to embody the revolutionary idea. But they do so radically moving away from the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Indeed, vanguard parties with boards are harshly criticized and they only accept electoral mass formations that seem to play a subordinate role to the social protests. The 21 The EPL, and behind the PC-ML, had a surprising turn in the early 1980s, when it not only abandoned Maoism, something which was regarded as a new ideological deviation, but broke with the isolationism that had been practiced to get closer to the social bases. That political shift provided it with revenues in areas where it was present, but led it to face other leftist organizations, especially the FARC, with which it had an old rivalry (ARCHILA et al., 2011, 152-198) .
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Tempo & Argumento Convención Nacional to be held, and when that was concluded in the turn of the century, communities in southern Bolívar, fueled by paramilitaries, were strongly opposed.
However, talks with the FARC were doomed to failure, not only because they were developed in the midst of war, where each side had a hidden agenda to get militarily stronger, but because paramilitaries got much bigger, fueled now by legalized selfdefense entities such as the cooperatives "Convivir," due to ties with sectors of the armed forces and regional elites, and especially funded by drug trade, which also increasingly scattered insurgency. Deterioration regarding human rights, despite the brand new Constitution, and increased forced displacement from areas of armed conflict, which in the turn of the century came from two million Colombians to nearly six million in 2014, 23 illustrate the humanitarian crisis that engulfed the country.
Under these conditions, the chaos of partisan left-wing became more apparent, and the recent political formations resulting from the demobilization of guerrilla forces did not escape it. Thus, the UP and the AD-M19 virtually disappeared from the political map in the 1990s, to say nothing about the leftist parties, which subsisted only as acronyms of a past that seemed remote. In 1998, the partisan left-wing did not obtain any parliamentary man, if we except a militant trade union leader from the MOIR, who managed to get a seat due to his social figuration. The fall of real socialism and the global crisis of Marxism were added by persistent violence in Colombia, and this frightened off any legal expression of the left-wing, leaving room for armed groups, which increasingly denied in practice the libertarian ideals they claimed to be inspired by.
This became dramatically evident in the armed confrontation between demobilized members of the EPL and a stronghold of this guerrilla that remained using weapons. The latter allied with the FARC, which sought to control trade union sectors and above all territories with a clear presence of "esperanzados," especially in the region of Urabá. Thus, it revived the old enmity between the guerrillas with a Soviet and Maoist inspiration, although those origins now seem to be things of the past. "Esperanzados," in turn, formed "comandos populares" for defense and sought support by the police and even paramilitary sectors. As a consequence, there was a fratricidal violence punctuated by chilling massacres on both sides, which ended up with the expulsion of the FARC from 
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Urabá and the disappearance of the UP in the region later this decade (ARCHILA et al., 2011, 175-185) .
Nevertheless, social resistance in Colombia took over political and military action.
Social unrest in the years after the end of the century increasingly entered into direct political grounds (ARCHILA et al., 2002) . Mobilization was not only for material needs, but also for the dispute regarding development plans and State policies, as well as the enforceability of State's rights. This encourages broad social and political convergences that will result in new organizational processes of the left-wings, as discussed below.
Towards reconstruction (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) The beginning of the new century accentuated the trends observed in the previous decade. Unipolarity and the U.S. hegemony suffered a devastating terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. It is clear that, just as the empire does not have a single center, its enemies are not located in a defined space, too (HARDT and NEGRI, 2002) .
Meanwhile, the neoliberal model shows clear signs of exhaustion in the midst of the global recession of the late 20 th century and it is also faced by social movements on a global basis, as already mentioned (SEOANE and TADDEI, 2001, 105-12) .
In Latin America, the crisis of neoliberalism is more pronounced, especially due to its bad social results (OCAMPO, 2004, 781-782) . Everywhere in the region the masses of unemployed, workers, peasants, Indians, students, housewives, and urban settlers, among others, are mobilizing against economic globalization and pushing for political change, thereby causing a shift towards the left-wing.
24
24 On a balance book regarding recent Latin American left-wings, they are descriptively named as "nueva izquierda" and characterized through five traits: plurality of organizational forms and objectives, expanded social bases and political agendas, putting civil society as the main space of political action, seeking revolutionary reforms, and assigning a leading role to democracy. These traits are summarized in two highly topical: search for alternatives to neo-liberalism and democratization of society (RODRÍGUEZ et al., 2005, 31-37) . Years before, Jorge Castañeda (1994, 25-26) contrasted it with the rightwing by advocating for change instead of continuity, democracy and human rights instead of national security, identity and national sovereignty instead of economic integration, social justice instead of economic performance, income distribution instead of market operation, reduced inequalities instead of competitiveness, social expenditure instead of inflation control, and need for expenditure instead of consolidation of government finances. In 2006, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, then leftist Colombian presidential candidate, intervened in the debate and said: "Between the old and the current left-wing there is a clear difference, and it is a change in utopia: while the classic left-wing was looking for a classless society (...) the modern one is looking for a possible democratic society" (El Espectador, Given this critical panorama, in Colombia, as elsewhere in Latin America, sociopolitical movements arise, 28 renewing from below the agenda of a left-wing fighting for freedom and equality, upholding the respect for difference. A part of its agenda is triggering the political negotiation of the armed struggle that seems to make its way to the recent talks between the FARC and the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) in Havana and those potential talks with the ELN. 29 Although the future is not guaranteed, there are hopeful signs that Colombia also goes, on its way, towards a possible utopia. 25 Historically, it is the second electoral result of the Colombian left-wing. The first was the vote for the AD-M19 for the 1991 constituent, which reached 27% (ARCHILA, 2003, 296) . 26 In fact, in 2010 and 2014 the amount of votes for a leftist presidential candidate was again close to 10%. 27 Just as in Bogotá in the last administration of mayor Samuel Moreno Díaz (2007 Díaz ( -2010 , grandson of general Rojas Pinilla. 28 We refer to groups like the Marcha Patriótica and the Congreso de los Pueblos, which gather several social and political movements, in an action that goes beyond the electoral process, without undervaluing it. 29 Santos, born from the bowels of Uribe's administration, differed from it only on the issue of peace, because regarding the other ones he follows the neoliberal agenda of his predecessor. Nevertheless, this break is enough so that hardcore Uribe followers declare an opposition that, as it often happens in Colombia, also combines all struggle forms.
